We explore whether corporate governance (CG) characteristics including independent boards, high levels of monitoring incentives, and CEO pay-performance sensitivity are related to the probability that Internet firms survived the capital market shakeout that occurred in the spring of the year 2000. Using a sample of 277 Internet firms that conducted IPOs from 1996-1999, we find that CG mechanisms are related to two possible outcomes: acquisition at a premium and outright failure. Furthermore, the results are stronger when the relationship is examined within a single SIC code. We conclude that a homogeneous sample helps to reveal how CG mechanisms protect shareholder investments. We also detect relationships between survivorship and traditional measures of financial condition, suggesting that Internet firms are subject to traditional economic determinants.
Introduction
Research that has investigated the link between corporate governance (CG) mechanisms and firm performance under routine operating circumstances has not detected consistent relationships (see, e.g., Kang and Sørensen 1999; Dalton, Daily, Certo, and Roengpitya 2002) . In an attempt to address this inconsistency, we explore the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance from two new perspectives. First, we argue that the lack of consistent evidence in prior research may be due to the heterogeneous nature of the sample firms. If particular governance mechanisms are most effective under certain circumstances, then more homogeneous samples may be required to detect a governance-performance relationship (Denis 2001 ).
Second, we choose the most basic measure of performance, firm survival as an independent entity, and explore whether traditional CG mechanisms serve to protect shareholder wealth during a time when firms are particularly likely to fail.
As our setting for homogeneous firms that are particularly likely to fail, we use a sample of 277 Internet firms that conducted initial public offerings (IPOs) during [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . We test whether firms that remained independent entities on January 1, 2003, had significantly different CG mechanisms than those firms that failed or were acquired in the years following the year 2000 "shakeout" in the Internet sector. We analyze the complete sample as well as a subset of firms that focus on software production (those firms in SIC 73 (Business Services)) that should have even greater homogeneity in their production functions and competitive conditions. Internet firms experienced a period of crisis following the severe drop in market values in the year 2000 (Demers and Lev 2001) , and -2 -so this setting involves firms facing significant investor and customer pressures. We use both logistic regression and event history analysis to analyze the relationships among CG mechanisms and firm survivorship. Since firms often exhibit a slow decline in performance before delisting (Baker and Kennedy 2002) , we measure survivorship as of January 1, 2003, almost three years after the onset of the crisis.
Our analysis is predicated on the basic assumption that firms with stronger CG mechanisms are more likely to have survived the Internet contraction. Stronger CG mechanisms consist of more independent Boards of Directors (e.g., Boards with a greater proportion of outside directors), Boards of Directors with stronger incentives to exert monitoring effort (e.g., Boards that own larger amounts of firm stock), and CEOs with stronger incentives to exert effort that increases shareholder value (e.g., CEOs with contracts with higher pay-performance sensitivity). While it is tempting to use hindsight to argue that CG mechanisms are second-order effects and that the "Internet bubble" was filled with companies that would fail regardless of CG, we argue that many of the firms had equally viable business models 1 and were competing for the same traffic and revenue, and that stronger CG mechanisms could have been the difference between a firm that won the battle for market share and the firm that lost. Schultz and Zaman (2001) find evidence consistent with Internet firms' rush to go public being driven by their desire to claim market share.
Figure 1 describes the progression of our analysis from an exploration of the entire sample of 277 Internet firms to an investigation of more homogeneous subsamples. In 1 The fact that Big 5 independent auditors accepted 267 of our 277 sample firms (96%) as clients speaks to the high perceived quality of our firms' business plans. Johnstone and Bedard (2001) model the client acceptance decision and provide evidence that audit firms do consider client business risk in the acceptance decision. Nonetheless, we control for business plan quality in our empirical analyses. particular, we recognize that firms are no longer independent entities on January 1, 2003, for one of two reasons, failure or acquisition. We further recognize that acquisitions occur both because the target's assets are particularly valuable to the acquirer and because the target's assets are available at a severe discount. We believe that the relationship between CG mechanisms and performance is likely to differ depending on which survival outcome the firm experiences.
Our empirical results reveal some interesting patterns in the relationships among CG mechanisms, financial condition, and firm survival. First, several traditional financial variables are highly associated with outright failure: firms with lower Altman bankruptcy scores, more negative cash flows, and lower business plan quality are more likely to fail.
Second, increasing the homogeneity of our sample reveals relationships among CG mechanisms and outright failure. In our SIC 73 subsample, firms with more outsiders on the Board and with greater CEO pay-performance sensitivities are less likely to fail, while firms whose CEO owns a greater percentage of stock are more likely to fail.
Third, none of the traditional financial variables is significantly associated with the likelihood that a firm is acquired at a premium price. Firms are more likely to be acquired at a premium price when outside directors and blockholders without board representation (i.e., entities that are independent of management with strong incentives to monitor the firm) own larger proportions of firm stock. Firms are less likely to be acquired at a premium when their boards of directors are larger (i.e., when management may have an easier time avoiding strict monitoring). Finally, we find no consistent associations among any of our CG or financial variables and the likelihood that firms will be acquired at a discount.
Taken as a whole, the results have several interesting implications for governance research and practice. First, our evidence supports our contention that the lack of a consistent association among CG mechanisms and firm performance could be due to the heterogeneity of most cross-sectional research samples. Second, our evidence suggests that acquired firms are likely to employ CG mechanisms that imply powerful external monitoring incentives; acquirers may demand such characteristics of their targets to reduce the chance that the target's perceived value derives from management subterfuge and not sustainable capabilities. Additionally, these CG mechanisms are traditional mechanisms (i.e., they are mechanisms that developed in the non-Internet corporate control setting). Thus, we provide further evidence that Internet firms may not require new governance mechanisms to protect shareholder wealth (cf. Rajan and Zingales 2000) .
Finally, we document a strong association between failure and traditional financial performance measures. Since we have controlled for the quality of the firm's business plan, this evidence also demonstrates that so-called "new economy" firms are subject to the same financial performance requirements as traditional firms. We believe that future research can exploit our results to identify and document settings and sectors where corporate governance and firm performance are related.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the topic of corporate governance while Section 3 describes the Internet and motivates our study.
Section 4 develops our hypotheses and Section 5 describes our sample, variable definitions, and research design. Section 6 presents the results of our statistical analyses and Section 7 concludes.
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Corporate Governance
Recent surveys of the CG literature describe the purpose of CG in several ways. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 737) assert that CG "deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment." Denis (2001, 192) posits that CG exists to address the problems that the separation of ownership and control in corporations creates. She states that CG "encompasses the set of institutional and market mechanisms that induce self-interested managers (the controllers) to maximize the value of the residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of its shareholders." Bushman and Smith (2001, 238) claim that CG mechanisms "facilitat [e] the efficient flow of scarce human and financial capital to promising investment opportunities."
Despite the obvious theoretical merits of corporate governance, the empirical findings regarding the relation between CG and performance have been weak and contradictory (Kang and Sørensen 1999; Dalton et al. 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach 2002) . We argue that this is a result of two main factors: (1) that the relationship between CG and firm performance is context-specific; and (2) that there may be many situations in which the returns to good governance are minimal because all firms are doing relatively well. We expand upon each of these points below.
Attempting to find a link between CG and financial performance using a crosssectional sample pooled over time and industry will yield little (Denis 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach 2002) . Denis (2001, 198) argues, for example, that we should not expect the same set of governance controls to be optimal for firms in varied settings, and consequently "a relationship that exists only for a subset of firms may not show up -6 -empirically in a test using a larger population." For example, increasing the firm's leverage reduces managerial discretion, and therefore may be related to higher value.
McConnell and Servaes (1995), however, show that this relationship only holds for firms in low-growth-opportunity settings and that the opposite effect obtains in high-growthopportunity settings.
Denis's argument suggests that a sample with more homogeneous firms is likely to produce results, so long as the governance variables chosen are appropriate for the setting. For example, insider dominance may be essential in some settings where technical expertise is critical for success. Similarly, if certain CG mechanisms are substitutes for one another (Dalton et al. 2002; Shleifer and Vishney 1997) , broad crosssectional tests may not detect such tradeoffs. 2 Given a specific control setting, however, the appropriate CG mechanism may be obvious.
Finally, external mechanisms such as the market for corporate control, competition, the job market for managers, and monitoring by shareholders and regulatory agencies all contribute to the optimal level of total control for the firm. These external mechanisms are more likely to be at similar levels for firms in a homogenous environment. Firms facing similar markets are more likely to have a common need for internal CG mechanisms. Internal mechanisms include monitoring by the Board of Directors, incentive plans for managers and other employees, and the internal labor market.
Research on CG assesses the use and effectiveness of these various mechanisms under specific firm circumstances (e.g., for firms with large proportions of their value tied to growth opportunities). While the three reviews from which we quote discuss some -7 -evidence that is consistent with theoretical expectations regarding the use and effectiveness of particular CG mechanisms, they agree that many unanswered questions about CG remain. We believe that the only way to answer these questions is to examine small, homogeneous samples. This reduces the variation of the external sources of control and provides a cleaner test of the internal CG-performance relation.
In addition, governance mechanisms may be most valuable when firms face great uncertainty about their survival. We hypothesize that the lack of consistent associations between firm performance and CG mechanisms is partly due to samples that consist mainly of firms whose shareholders have no incentives to complain about managerial rent-taking (that is, things are routine and everyone is receiving an adequate return). In a crisis situation involving financial distress, however, we argue that firms with stronger governance will fare better.
We overcome these two problems with existing CG research in the following ways.
First, we begin with a sample of firms that are somewhat homogeneous (sample-period firms participating in the Internet sector). 3 We then reduce the sample to those firms in one industry segment and expect those firms to be even more homogeneous. Second, we examine firms that generally face great common uncertainty about their survival. We believe that CG mechanisms are more likely to affect firm performance (survival) under such circumstances. In the next section, we further describe the Internet sector and the characteristics that make it a potentially fruitful setting for examining the link between CG mechanisms and firm survivorship.
2 Cui and Mak (2002) also invoke the homogeneity argument in their study of ownership organization and performance in high R&D firms. Their sample, however, includes firms from several industries with distinctly different product life cycles and production functions (e.g., software and biotechnology). 3 See section 5 for a definition of Internet firms.
Internet Firms and Corporate Governance
Over 300 firms raised equity capital through initial public offerings between 1996 and 1999 (inclusive) in Internet-related ventures. In early 2000, the market value (and hence the viability) of many of these firms fell dramatically. Thus, as of April 2000, firms trying to compete in the Internet sector not only have common production functions (primarily technology and human capital) and serve similar clientele, they also face a substantial amount of uncertainty regarding their financial future.
We argue that the 277 firms in our main sample compete in the same external environment. First, the firms' very existence depends on the macroeconomic adoption of a new technology (the Internet) by a sufficient number of users (Afuah and Tucci 2003) .
These firms then engage in competition for users (if your eyeballs are on Yahoo.com, they cannot be on Gap.com), human resource skills (the most sought-after managers were being wooed with excessive compensation packages), and the probability of being acquired by other expanding Internet firms (Schultz and Zaman 2001, 349) .
We also recognize, however, that there are differences in production functions and competitive conditions among firms in this sector (e.g., those serving consumers directly versus those serving other businesses), and propose that focusing on specific SIC groupings may create an even more homogeneous sample (e.g., Yahoo.com does not grow at the expense of Gap.com, but rather at the expense of its direct competitors in the portal group). We therefore examine one large industry segment, SIC 73 (Business Services). This segment (67% of our sample) consists primarily of software producers whose production functions and competitive environments are quite homogeneous.
We also acknowledge that firm characteristics beyond corporate governance may affect firm survival. There may have been some ventures funded during the "Internet Bubble" that, under calmer circumstances, would not have garnered investment capital.
We control for this potential difference in business model quality with data on underwriter quality. Underwriters who care strongly about their reputation would not support an IPO for a low-quality company (Loughran and Ritter 2003) .
Hypothesis Development
We develop our hypotheses from the perspective of standard resolutions of the problem of the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen 1983) . For example, we assume that managers who own less than 100% of the firm's stock are capable of extracting rents at the expense of other shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and that the "strength" of a particular governance mechanism depends on its ability to deter managers from extracting these rents. We develop hypotheses regarding three dimensions of CG: monitoring by the Board of Directors, incentive alignment through decision-maker ownership of the organization, and incentive alignment through payperformance sensitivities in the CEO's contract. Figure 1 depicts the partitions into which we divide our sample. First, we determine whether the firm remains an independent entity as of January 1, 2003. We then separate those firms that are no longer independent into those that failed and those that other firms acquired. Finally, we determine if the acquired firms' value at the time of their acquisition represents a premium (suggesting a healthy operation) or a discount (suggesting a distressed operation) over the firm's market value at the announcement date. We expect firms that remain independent or that receive a premium during acquisition will have stronger internal CG mechanisms than firms that fail or that could only obtain a discount on the value of their shares.
Board Monitoring
In order to monitor management effectively, members of the board must (1) be independent of management and (2) We expect stronger results in the more homogeneous SIC 73 subsample.
The board independence measures we consider are Board size, the percentage of independent directors on the Board, 4 CEO duality, 5 whether the CEO is also a founder of the firm, and whether a venture capital firm has a representative on the Board. The next few paragraphs describe the evidence regarding these Board characteristics and CG strength.
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Research has demonstrated negative associations between the size of the Board and CG strength, consistent with smaller boards being able to reach decisions more quickly and being less susceptible to managerial influence. Smaller boards are more likely to remove the CEO of a poorly performing firm (Yermack 1996; Wu 2000) and to negotiate CEO compensation contracts that are more sensitive to performance (Yermack 1996) .
Research has also demonstrated that Boards that have a larger proportion of outside directors (and, sometimes, non-employee directors) take actions consistent with independence from management. Boards with greater proportions of outside directors are more likely to remove the CEO of a poorly performing firm (Weisbach 1988 ) and appear to make acquisition-related decisions that are more conducive to increased shareholder value (Byrd and Hickman 1992) .
Other characteristics of the Board may also determine the level of influence of the CEO over the board. For example, Goyal and Park (2002) demonstrate that Boards with CEO duality are less likely to replace a CEO given poor company performance. A similar argument suggests that boards for which the CEO is a founding member of the firm may also be less independent and therefore weaker monitors (though to our knowledge there is not explicit evidence on this Board characteristic). 6 Other monitoring variables considered in prior literature include whether the CEO sits on the compensation committee and whether the firm's Board is classified (i.e., whether only a fraction of the Board members are subject to re-election each year). We do not believe that these mechanisms are relevant in this setting. Neither of these CG mechanisms should improve a firm's ability to navigate crises or uncertainty.
Finally, Engel, Gordon, and Hayes (2002) present evidence that the presence of venture capitalists (VCs) in entrepreneurial firms enhances performance. VCs are likely to have significant incentives to ensure that boards provide diligent monitoring effort.
Baker and Gompers (2001) provide corroborating evidence.
Ownership Organization
Another CG dimension that can help align the interests of decision-makers with stockholders is the ownership organization of the firm's stock. Independent entities that own relatively more of the firm's stock will have greater incentive to exert effective monitoring (and disciplining) effort. Our second set of hypotheses comprises:
H2a: The ownership level of monitoring parties is negatively associated with the outright failure of Internet firms. H2b: The ownership level of monitoring parties is positively associated with the acquisition of Internet firms at a premium. H2c: The ownership level of monitoring parties is negatively associated with the acquisition of Internet firms at a discount.
Many firms require that board members own stock and compensate board members only with firm stock and/or stock options. Owning shares of the firm's stock means that monitoring parties' wealth increases in alignment with shareholder wealth. Perry (2000) provides evidence that boards that own larger amounts of firm stock take actions consistent with greater monitoring effort. We expect larger percentage ownership by the monitoring entities to encourage boards to take decisions that are in the best interest of the shareholders (i.e. continued survival or acquisition at a premium). Similar arguments apply to large ownership stakes, or blocks: these shareholders should have more incentive to exert high monitoring effort (e.g., Wu 2000) .
There are conflicting arguments for the effect of increasing CEO ownership on monitoring and performance. One argument suggests that high CEO ownership is gives the CEO greater power in negotiations with the Board. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model the CEO-Board relationship as a bargaining game, and indicate that CEOs with greater bargaining power are more able to extract rents from shareholders. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Baker and Gompers (2001) provide evidence that the CEO's voting stake is associated with her bargaining power. Thus, greater CEO ownership may be associated with lower performance as CEOs extract rents from shareholders.
Alternatively, Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrate that as the manager relinquishes more ownership his ability to maximize his own utility at the expense of shareholders increases. With lower ownership stakes, CEOs may choose to take on projects that benefit them directly, and do not benefit shareholders. Thus, lower CEO ownership may be associated with lower performance. We leave resolution of which effect is stronger to the empirical analyses.
Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Research using the principal-agent model suggests that the CEO compensation contract is a powerful means of reducing agency costs due to information asymmetry.
Optimal contracts provide the CEO with incentives to take actions (i.e., exert high effort) that maximize the return to the residual claimants (see Lambert (2001) 
Variable Definitions

Dependent Variables
We are interested in the effects of traditional CG mechanisms in the Internet sector, with a maintained hypothesis that stronger traditional CG mechanisms make successful performance (survival as an independent entity or acquisition at a premium) more likely.
We classify firms into one of four outcome categories. A firm is a SURVIVOR if its CRSP delist code as of January 1, 2003, is 100 (the code for a continuing independent entity). A firm is a FAILURE if it delists on or before January 1, 2003, and its delist code is 500 or greater (codes for firms that no longer trade on the exchange but were not acquired). A firm is considered an acquired at a premium firm (ACQ(P)) if it delists on or before January 1, 2003, has a CRSP delist code between 200 and 299 (the codes for acquired firms), and the price the acquiring firm paid was equal to or greater than the CRSP market value at the acquisition announcement date. Finally, a firm is an acquired at a discount firm (ACQ(D)) if it delists on or before January 1, 2003, has a CRSP delist code between 200 and 299 (the codes for acquired firms), and the price the acquiring firm paid was less than the CRSP market value at the acquisition announcement date.
Our analysis involves logistic and event history analysis of the likelihood that a firm experiences a particular non-survival outcome relative to remaining an independent entity. In the discussions to follow, we consider ACQ(P) firms to be better-performing than all others due to the premium value their acquirers place on them. We consider SURVIVORS to be better performers than FAILURES and ACQ(D) firms since they remain ongoing independent entities. We consider FAILURES and ACQ(D) firms to be equally poor performers for lack of an economic reason to consider one a better outcome than the other. We use event history analysis to control for the relatively slow process of failure (Baker and Kennedy 2002) . The event history method adds the dimension of time to our analysis, as we model not only whether a firm experienced failure or acquisition, but also when the event occurred. Thus, in our case, it may be that firms face an increasing likelihood of failing as time since they went public passes (Audretsch and Lehman 2002), and we control for this likelihood with the event history model.
Independent Variables
We measure our independent variables as close to the beginning of the Internet shakeout of Spring 2000 as possible. We obtain data for our measures of board monitoring, ownership organization, and pay-performance sensitivity from either the firm's proxy statement released in late 1999 or early 2000, from the firm's 10-K if no proxy is available, or the firm's IPO prospectus from late 1999 (for firms with no proxy or 10-K). We obtain our measures of financial condition from the COMPUSTAT annual industrial file for the end of the fiscal year on or before March 31, 2000.
We measure Board monitoring strength in several ways. BDSIZE is the number of members of the Board of Directors. We expect larger Boards to be positively associated with poorer performance since their ability to make decisions is impaired by their size and their monitoring ability is consequently decreased. OUTSIDE is the proportion of the Board of Directors that is not affiliated with the firm through either employment or business relationships. We expect greater proportions of outside directors to have larger monitoring capability and thus to be associated with better performance. CHAIR is 1 if the CEO is also the Chair of the Board (duality), and zero otherwise. We expect CEO duality to be associated with lower performance since the lack of existence of a separate Board Chair with specific monitoring responsibility implies lower control. FOUNDER is 1 if the CEO is also the (or a) founder of the firm, and zero otherwise. We expect FOUNDER to be associated with lower performance: if the CEO is also a founder of the firm, he or she will have greater relative power and thus the Board's monitoring strength will be lower. Finally, VENCAP is 1 if there is a representative of a venture capital firm on the Board, and zero otherwise. We expect that the presence of a venture capitalist on the Board will increase its incentive to monitor as well as its monitoring expertise. We expect that VENCAP will, therefore, be positively associated with performance.
We measure two dimensions of ownership organization: the CEO's ownership and the ownership of independent monitors. CEOPER is the percentage of the firm's shares that the CEO owns. A high value on CEOPER can have two opposing implications, as we discuss in Section 4. It may indicate that the CEO's interests are aligned with those of other shareholders, in which case CEOPER would be positively associated with performance. Conversely, high CEOPER could indicate that the CEO has the ability to extract rents and be relatively immune from monitoring efforts. We include the ownership of three types of independent monitors, OUTPER, BLOCK, and BLOCKBD are the percentages of the firm's shares that outside board members, 5% blockholder without Board representation, and 5% blockholders with Board representation own. We expect all of these variables to be associated with better performance since larger stakes provide all of these groups with greater incentives for monitoring management and exerting effort to help the firm survive.
Our measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPSENS) 9 follows Murphy (1999) and captures the dollar change in CEO wealth per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. We expect a positive association between the CEO's pay-performance sensitivity and firm performance.
Control Variables
While we expect that the strength of CG mechanisms has an effect on the likelihood of firm survival, we recognize that there are other factors that contribute to that likelihood. We consider the firm's financial condition as indicated by Altman's (1968) bankruptcy index (ALTMAN), 10 the growth in the firm's sales from 1998 to 1999 ]}. MV is the market value of the firm at the end of December 1999 (CRSP). CEO Equity is the market value of the CEO's stock holdings at the end of December 1999 (Proxy). CEO Options is the approximate value of the CEO's option portfolio at the end December 1999 (Proxy), using Murphy's (1999) estimation method. CEO Salary is the present value of an annuity of the CEO's fiscal 1999 salary assuming the CEO retires at 65 (or in 3 years if the CEO is currently over 65) and a 3% discount rate. e e , e o , and e s are the elasticities of equity, option value, and salary, respectively, to changes in shareholder wealth. 10 We do not apply Zmijewski's (1984) bankruptcy prediction parameters to assess financial condition because he excludes firms in SIC codes greater than 6000 when calculating his parameters. They are not applicable, therefore, to over half of our sample firms. 11 SGROW is set to 1 when the firm had no sales in 1998 due to it not yet being in existence. 12 The CASHFLOW variable (Operating Cash Flow/Sales) is set to the minimum sample value for firms with zero 1999 sales. Removal of these observations does qualitatively affect our results.
some Internet firms possess stronger business models and therefore enjoy a higher probability of success (Afuah and Tucci 2003) . Our proxy for business plan quality (BPQUAL) is the quality of the lead underwriter for the firm's initial public offering. Loughran and Ritter (2003) , for example, argue that the top-quality underwriters will not support firms that do not appear likely to succeed. These authors provide a measure of underwriter quality that we employ.
14 Finally, we include the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets (SIZE).
Model Specification
We test our hypotheses using logistic and event history specifications. Our logistic models predict the likelihood that a firm fails outright (hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a), is acquired at a premium (hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b), or is acquired at a discount (hypotheses 1c, 2c, and 3c). The model we estimate is: OUTCOME = β 0 + β 1 *BDSIZE + β 2 *OUTSIDE + β 3 *CHAIR + β 4 *FOUNDER + β 5 *VENCAP + β 6 *CEOPER + + β 7 *OUTPER + β 8 *BLOCK + β 9 *BLOCKBD + β 10 *PPSENS + β 11 *ALTMAN + β 12 *SGROW + β 13 *CASHFLOW + β 14 *AGE + β 15 *BPQUAL + β 16 *SIZE + ε
Where OUTCOME is either FAILURE, ACQ(P), or ACQ(D). In each analysis, the SURVIVOR outcome is the alternative.
For the event history analysis, we estimate a Weibull model, which takes the following basic form (Blossfeld and Rowher 1995: 177) :
In the above model, covariates are entered in the A vector, making a= exp{Aα}. In our case, then:
13 Our results are robust to measuring AGE as the time from inception to the firm's IPO (Dowell et al. 2002) . a = exp {α 0 + α 1 *BDSIZE + α 2 *OUTSIDE + α 3 *CHAIR + α 4 *FOUNDER + α 5 *VENCAP + α 6 *CEOPER + α 7 *OUTPER + α 8 *BLOCK + α 9 *BLOCKBD + α 10 *PPSENS + α 11 *ALTMAN + α 12 *SGROW + α 13 *CASHFLOW + α 14 *AGE + α 15 *BPQUAL + α 16 *SIZE} There are several options available for estimating parametric event history models (Blossfeld and Rowher 1995) . We have chosen a Weibull specification for two reasons.
First, this specification is very flexible, as it can represent either increasing or decreasing hazard over time, depending upon the value of the "shape parameter" (b in the above equation) in the models. If the shape parameter is less than unity, then the hazard of exit decreases over time, while if it is greater than unity, the hazard increases over time, as can be seen from the above specification. If the shape parameter is equal to unity, then the model reduces to a simple exponential model, in which the hazard rate does not vary with time. Our second reason for choosing the Weibull specification is that it has been shown to fit the data well in a similar research setting (Audretsch and Lehman 2002). for the full sample). Finally, the median Altman bankruptcy index score falls within the 14 We use the quality rating of the lead underwriter, from http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. These ratings have appeared in Loughran and Ritter (2003) and are adaptations of the ratings that first appeared in Carter and Manaster (1990) . The lowest rating is 1, the highest is 9.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests
bankrupt region for the full sample (1.69 is less than the cutoff value of 1.81) but is in the indeterminate range for the SIC 73 sample (1.87 is greater than the cutoff value of 1.81), though the mean value of ALTMAN for both samples is in the indeterminate range of 1.81 to 2.99 (Altman 1968, 606) . Table 2 firms that are in existence as independent entities on that date (see Figure 1) . For the full sample, only financial control variables are significantly related to failure. Firms with better Altman bankruptcy scores, stronger cashflow, and more prestigious underwriters are significantly less likely to fail.
In the SIC 73 subsample, however, several corporate governance variables are significantly related to the likelihood of failure. This outcome is consistent with our conjecture that increasing sample homogeneity will improve our power to detect relationships between CG and performance. In particular, Table 4 shows that firms with a higher proportion of outside board members and higher pay-performance sensitivity for the CEO are significantly less likely to fail, evidence consistent with our predictions in hypotheses 1a and 3a. None of the independent monitor ownership variables has a significant coefficient, so the Logit Analysis: ACQ(P) Outcome
In Table 5 , we report the results of our logit analysis of Internet survivors and firms that are acquired at a premium (ACQ(P)). For the complete sample, firms are more likely to be acquired at a premium if outside directors own a higher percentage of the firm's shares and if there is a blockholder without board representation. This evidence supports hypothesis 2b. Conversely, firms with larger boards are less likely to be acquired at a premium, which supports hypothesis 1b. The coefficient on PPSENS is not significant, so hypothesis 3b receives no support. Interestingly, none of the control variables is significantly associated with the likelihood that a firm is acquired at a premium.
The same results hold in the SIC 73 subsample with the exception that blockholders without board representation are not significantly associated with acquisition at a premium. This result does not support our contention that focusing on the SIC 73 subsample will improve our power to detect relationships between CG mechanisms and 15 We assess the robustness of our results by examining the impact of outlying observations and of changing variable specifications. We Winsorize the independent variables by setting extreme values to +/-three standard deviations from the mean of the variable. Our inferences do not change. We use alternative specifications for firm age (age at IPO) and size (revenues), and our inferences are not sensitive to this change.
-24 -performance. The loss of power due to decreasing sample size may be offsetting any gain in power from increasing sample homogeneity.
Logit Analysis: ACQ(D) Outcome Table 6 presents the results of our multivariate comparison of Internet survivors and firms that are acquired at a discount (ACQ(D)). We do not find any significant CG or control variables that help to explain this performance outcome in either the full sample or the SIC 73 subsample. Thus, we find no support for hypotheses 1c, 2c, or 3c. One explanation may be that there are relatively few firms acquired at a discount in our sample and so the statistical power is insufficient to detect the effects that hypotheses 1c, 2c, and 3c predict.
Event History Analysis Tables 7, 8 , and 9 replicate the analysis in Tables 4, 5 , and 6, respectively, using event history models in place of logistic regression. The event history analysis recognizes that there may be differences between a firm that fails a few months after it goes public, and one that lives for several years, and explicitly controls for the effect of time on the rate of failure, acquisition at a premium, and acquisition at a discount. In Tables 7, 8 , and 9, a positive coefficient indicates that increasing values on that variable increase the likelihood that the firm fails, is acquired at a premium, or acquired at a discount, respectively. Two other general issues with respect to the event history model are worth noting. First, in all models, the shape parameter is greater than unity. This indicates that the risk of experiencing an event increases as time since going public passes, supporting the use of event history analysis. Second, the likelihood ratio presented in Tables 7, 8 , and 9 compares the reported models' fit to that of a baseline -25 -model that contains only the control variables. The chi-square test in the last row of the Tables 7, 8 , and 9 indicates whether the governance variables significantly improve the model's fit. For Tables 7 and 8 , the governance variables do significantly improve the model, but for Table 9 they add no predictive power.
The event history results are highly consistent with the logistic regression results, though the event history models reveal some additional effects of governance on survival;
we discuss only the additional effects here. In Table 7 , we find that, for the full sample, a higher proportion of outside directors decreases the likelihood of failure, while the presence of a blockholder without board representation increases the failure rate. Within SIC 73, having a founder as CEO increases the likelihood of failure, and consistent with the logit results, a higher proportion of stock held by the CEO increases the failure rate, while greater pay-performance sensitivity decreases it.
In Table 8 , we find that the results mirror the logit analysis with three exceptions.
First, for the full sample, we do not find that larger boards affect the likelihood of being acquired at a premium in the full sample, whereas the logit analysis showed that larger boards decrease the likelihood of being acquired at a premium. Within SIC 73, the risk of acquisition at a premium decreases with increasing board size, however. Second, within SIC 73, we find evidence that firms with venture capital representation on the boards are more likely to be acquired. Third, within SIC 73, we find that having a blockholder without board representation increases the probability of being acquired at a premium. This is consistent with the logit and event history results for the full sample, but this effect was not found with logit analysis of SIC 73. Again, we find that we cannot predict the likelihood that a firm will be acquired at a discount. The only variable that is significant is the proportion of shares held by outside board members, but we are reluctant to draw any conclusions from this lone result given that the overall model is not significant.
Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, we study the relationship between corporate governance and firm survival in the Internet sector. Our goal is to contribute to the corporate governance literature by demonstrating that relationships between CG and performance may be hidden in prior research by sample heterogeneity and by providing evidence that governance may matter more for issues of firm survival after a severe environmental shock than for issues of routine annual returns. Finally, we are interested in contributing additional evidence related to the question of whether so-called "new economy" (in our case, Internet) firms are fundamentally different from traditional firms.
Our results are in line with our expectations relative to our primary objectives. While we detect some relationships between CG mechanisms and firm survival in our full sample, focusing on the more homogeneous SIC 73 subsample seems to improve the power of our tests. The consistent results between our two specifications (logistic regressions and event history analysis) support our prediction that CG is related to firm survival. Finally, we find relationships among Internet firm survival and traditional measures of both corporate governance strength and financial condition. Our results therefore add to the body of evidence (e.g., Hand 2000) that indicates the "new economy" may not be nearly as different as some have argued (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2000).
-27 -Some caution is required, however, in interpreting and generalizing our results. Our sample focuses on Internet firms; the "new economy" also includes other firms whose primary source of value is human capital. Additionally, there is empirical evidence that
Internet firms are different from other firms along certain dimensions (e.g., Dowell et al. (2002) show that, after controlling for known determinants of stock price volatility, a firm's Internet status retains significant explanatory power). The relationships we detect, therefore, between CG mechanisms and firm survival may not generalize to other types of firms. Finally, ours is the first study to focus exclusively on a sector of the economy during a time of competitive crisis. Our results lead to many future research opportunities that continue to identify circumstances in which governance is related to performance. 
CEOPER
The percentage of the firm's total shares outstanding that the CEO owns.
OUTPER
The percentage of the firm's total shares outstanding that the outside directors collectively own.
BLOCK
The percentage of the firm's total shares outstanding that 5% blockholders without Board representation own.
BLOCKBD
The percentage of the firm's total shares outstanding that 5% blockholders with Board representation own.
PPSENS
The CEO's pay-performance sensitivity, expressed as the dollar increase in CEO wealth for a $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth. ALTMAN Altman's (1968) bankruptcy prediction index, calculated as 1.2*(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4*(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3*(EBIT/Total Assets) + 0.6*(Total Equity/Total Liabilities) + 1.0*(Total Revenues/Total Assets).
SGROW
The percentage growth in sales from 1998 to 1999 [(1999 [( Revenues -1998 Revenues)]/1998 Revenues.] We set this variable equal to 1 (100% growth) for firms with no 1998 revenues.
CASHFLOW
A measure of the cash consumption rate of the firm. Following Demers and Lev (2001) , the value is the firm's 1999 net operating cash flows divided by 1999 total revenues.
AGE
The number of years from firm inception to January 1, 2000.
BPQUAL
The quality of the firm's business plan. We use the quality rating of the lead underwriter, from http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. These ratings have appeared in Loughran and Ritter (2003) and are adaptations of the ratings that first appeared in Carter and Manaster (1990) . The lowest rating is 1, the highest is 9.
SIZE
The natural logarithm of the firm's total assets (Compustat Data Item #6). All variables are as defined in Table 2 . 
FAILURE
1 if the firm was delisted but not acquired, 0 if the firm is a Survivor. Acquired firms are not included.
All other variables are as defined in Table 2 . 
ACQ(P)
1 if the firm was acquired at a premium (i.e., for a price equal to or greater than its market value), 0 if the firm is a Survivor. Failures and firms acquired at a discount are excluded.
ACQ(D)
1 if the firm was acquired at a discount (i.e., for a price less than its market value), 0 if the firm is a Survivor. Failures and firms acquired at a premium are excluded.
FAILURE
ACQ(P)
ACQ(D)
